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WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE RISK
DISCLOSURE
Jeffrey M. McFarland*
ABSTRACT
Investors are clamoring for companies to include more climate
change risk disclosure in their periodic reports filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Yet public companies
in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how
climate change affects their businesses. Although there have been
several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these risks and
one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not
effecting changes in disclosure practices quickly enough. This
Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines for
mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities
filings. The guidelines seek to provide investors with meaningful
disclosure, without overburdening the companies making the
disclosure. This framework could be used by the SEC in formulating
guidance regarding climate change risk disclosure under existing
disclosure rules, or in creating new rules mandating the disclosure.

INTRODUCTION
Public companies in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to
investors how climate change affects their businesses. 1 Despite repeated
requests from investor groups for more disclosure, and despite increasing public interest in the effects of global warming, poor disclosure
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.
1. See AM. LAW INST., CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE BY THE S&P 500, 186 (2007)
[hereinafter CERES REPORT]. The report was commissioned by CERES, a national
coalition of investors, environmental groups and other organizations, and Calvert, an
institutional investor. See also PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE
RISK DISCLOSURE 2 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4547.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK PETITION].
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persists. 2 This Article summarizes some of the efforts to improve disclosure of climate change risks, and recommends elements of a mandatory disclosure system for climate change risk disclosure under the
securities laws.
Climate change issues are regularly featured in the pages of the
New York Times and on public radio programs. 3 It was a topic of debate
among candidates for president in 2008. 4
Al Gore’s film An
Inconvenient Truth, which sought to raise awareness of global warming
worldwide, won an Academy Award in 2007 for best documentary
feature. 5 Gore also won a share of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, along
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for their
“efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made
climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are
needed to counteract such change.” 6
The IPCC describes climate system warming as “unequivocal” and
very likely the result of greenhouse gas concentrations (“GHGs”). 7 In
2.
3.

See infra notes 3-6, 13-20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Long Hwa-Shu, Bank Takes Environmental Step Into Rural Town,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at C7; Felicity Barringer & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prominent
Green Group to Help Buyout Firm, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2008, at C1; Megan Williams,
Carriers Afraid They’ll Cough Up for CO2, MARKETPLACE, Dec. 21, 2007, available at
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/12/21/eu_new_co2_airplane_law/;
Richard Harris, Businesses See Green in Iceland’s Volcano Power, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO WEEKEND EDITION SATURDAY, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=17548004; Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Report on
Climate Details Risks of Inaction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at A1.
4. See Edmund L. Andrews, When Fuel and Politics Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2007, at C1; see also BarackObama.com, New Energy for America, http://www.barack
obama.com/issues/energy/ (last visited July 2, 2008); JohnMcCain.com, John McCain’s
Principles for Climate Policy, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/da151a1c733a-4dc1-9cd3-f9ca5caba1de.htm (last visited July 2, 2008).
5. See Norman Mayersohn, Two Steps Greener, One Back, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2007, § 10, at 12.
6. See Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 2 (Nov. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC
FOURTH ASSESSMENT]. The IPCC is a group of hundreds of scientists from countries
that are members of the World Meteorological Organization or the United Nations
Environment Programme. It was created as a source of objective information about
global warming, and is made available to policymakers for purposes of evaluating the
social and economic impacts of global warming. See About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/

2009

WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE
RISK DISCLOSURE

283

its Climate Change 2007 report, the IPCC states “[t]here is high
agreement and much evidence that with current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global GHG
emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades.” 8 Moreover,
climate change is likely to “lead to some impacts that are abrupt or ireversible, depending upon the rate and magnitude of climate change.” 9
Global warming is also gaining traction among governmental
bodies. The United States Supreme Court recently stated:
The harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized. The Government’s own objective assessment of the
relevant science and a strong consensus among qualified experts
indicate that global warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise in
sea levels, severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems, a
significant reduction in winter snowpack with direct and important
economic consequences, and increases in the spread of disease and
10
the ferocity of weather events.

In October 2007, Senators Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner
(R-VA) introduced the America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 after
approval by a senate subcommittee. 11 America’s Climate Security Act
is designed to direct the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt
programs to address GHG emissions. 12
In short, climate change is a daily topic of conversation, and is recognized as one of the most significant issues of our time by the media,
government, and scientific, international, and business communities. 13
Although skeptics remain, human contribution to the harmful effects of
climate change is gaining increasing acceptance with each passing
year. 14
about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
8. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 7.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (2007). Four of the justices
dissented with respect to the outcome of the case, but Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion
did not dispute the quoted phrase, despite acknowledging uncertainties associated with
determining the specific causes. Id. at 1471, 1474-75.
11. S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
12. Id. § 3.
13. See, e.g., CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at i; DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S.
WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY
TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2006); GOV’T
INSTS., INC., THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS: MAKING BOTTOM-LINE SENSE OF
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Investor groups wonder how climate change affects the businesses
in which they have invested. Investors have been calling for voluntary
disclosure about environmental policies for nearly two decades. 15 Yet in
2000, Kimberly O’Neill Packard and Forest L. Reinhardt wrote in the
Harvard Business Review: “Surprisingly few companies make public
statements – or even have pages on their Web sites – about how they are
dealing with climate change.” 16 In 2007, a study by a group of institutional investors found that “disclosure practices among the nation’s
500 largest companies are severely lacking.” 17 The group urged public
companies to voluntarily disclose climate change risk in a more meaningful way. 18 In September 2007, a separate group of institutional investors, environmental organizations and governmental officers petitioned the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
release guidance for reporting climate change issues under existing mandatory disclosure rules and regulations. 19 And, at the company level,
shareholders frequently submit proposals relating to climate change disclosure for inclusion in annual proxy statements. 20
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE
GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS].
14. A law journal article is not the proper forum for discussing the underlying
science of climate change. Despite pockets of skepticism, the author assumes the overwhelming trend is accurate, and that climate change is a serious risk to the planet. Not
everyone agrees of course. For two examples: The founder of The Weather Channel,
John Coleman, currently a meteorologist at a San Diego television affiliate, has examined the science and believes global warming “is the greatest scam in history.” John
Coleman, Global Warming Is a Scam, available at http://www.kusi.com/weather/
colemanscorner/11621966.html. Christopher C. Horner, a Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, believes the attention given to global warming is indicative of
alarmist behavior. CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO
GLOBAL WARMING AND ENVIRONMENTALISM (2007). Then there are groups like the
Free Enterprise Action Fund, which, regardless of the science, believes corporate social
responsibility to be “anti-business.” Free Enterprise Action Fund, http://www.freeenter
priseactionfund.com/advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
15. Mark A. White, Effect of the Green Movement on Investors, in THE GREENING
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 47-50.
16. Kimberly O’Neill Packard & Forest L Reinhardt, What Every Executive Needs
to Know About Global Warming, HARV. BUS. R. (July-Aug. 2000),129, 134, reprinted
in HARVARD BUS. SCH. PRESS, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON GREEN BUSINESS
STRATEGY (2007).
17. See CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
18. Id.
19. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 2-3.
20. See, e.g., OGE Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 541778 (Feb. 27,
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This Article argues for mandatory disclosure of climate change
risks in periodic reports filed under the securities laws, which are available to the investing public through the SEC’s website. 21 Part I of this
Article will briefly review the current framework of periodic mandatory
disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”), and the associated rules as they may relate to climate change risk
disclosure. 22 Part II discusses the current state of climate change risk
disclosure, and some of the reasons underlying the reluctance to increase
climate change disclosure. Part III describes current attempts to improve disclosure of climate risks, through both voluntary and mandatory
disclosure proposals. This Part also includes a critique of the proposed
systems, as well as a discussion about whether climate change risk ought
to be the subject of SEC guidance or rulemaking. Finally, Part IV builds
on the existing proposals to suggest a framework for periodic mandatory
disclosure that the SEC should use in publishing guidance under existing
securities laws, or as the basis for adopting additional rules governing a
company’s periodic reporting.
PART I. SECURITIES DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
A. Disclosure Required in Public Company Reports
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act requires all issuers of registered
securities to file periodic reports with the SEC, and grants the SEC rulemaking authority to prescribe the form and content of those reports. 23
The periodic reports required to be filed by issuers under Section 13(a)

2008); Pulte Homes, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 384377 (Feb. 11, 2008). Their
efforts have met with varying degrees of success. Compare OGE Energy, SEC NoAction Letter, 2008 WL 541778 (Feb. 27, 2008) (allowing OGE Energy to exclude a
proposal asking for a board of directors report about how the company is assessing the
impact of climate change on the business) with Pulte Homes, SEC No-Action Letter,
2008 WL 384377 (Feb. 11, 2008) (rejecting Pulte Homes’ request to exclude a proposal
asking for a board of directors report about the feasibility of the company developing
policies that will minimize the company’s impact on climate change).
21. The SEC maintains a database of periodic filings submitted to the SEC known
as “EDGAR.” SEC, Researching Public Companies Through EDGAR: A Guide For
Investors, http://www.sec.gov/invstor/pubs/edgarguide.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
The EDGAR database can be searched at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/web
users.htm.
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2007).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2007).
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and the associated rules include the annual report on Form 10-K, 24 and
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, among others. 25
Forms 10-Q and 10-K are scarcely forms at all, at least not as the
term is commonly understood. While they provide a framework for the
required disclosure, they explicitly state in their instructions that they are
not blank forms, but rather “guide cop[ies]” to be used in preparing the
periodic reports. 26 Instead, Forms 10-Q and 10-K refer to Regulation SK, adopted by the SEC in connection with the filing of forms under the
Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). 27
Regulation S-K provides a more detailed set of guidelines for disclosure
in the quarterly and annual reports, but is broad enough to maintain
flexibility across a wide range of business activities.
Both the quarterly and annual reports require the issuer to disclose
information about the company’s financial condition, results of operations and legal proceedings, and risks to which the company is subject. 28
The annual report further requires a discussion of the business developments at the company. 29 Those matters implicate Items 101, 103, 303
and 503(c) of Regulation S-K, and the company’s audited financial
statements. 30 A brief description of each of those items follows.

24.
25.

Requirements of Annual Reports, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2007).
Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Form 10-QSB, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13
(2007). Issuers also must file current reports on Form 8-K, but those reports are not
relevant to this Article. Current Reports on Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2007).
“Current reports” refers to several events specified by the SEC as being significant
enough to require the company to make public disclosure of the event prior to the time
the next 10-Q quarterly report or 10-K annual report is due. Events include the entry
into or termination of a definitive material agreement, changes in control, business
acquisitions, dispositions and combinations and failure to pay a required dividend,
among many other events. Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2007). While it is conceivable that a climate change event would be significant enough to trigger a Form 8-K
filing, the system in place appears to be adequate for the task.
26. General Instruction C in Form 10-Q. Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2007)
[hereinafter, Form 10-Q]; see also General Instruction C in Form 10-K. Form 10-K, 17
C.F.R. § 249.310 (2007) [hereinafter Form 10-K].
27. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2007); Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2007).
28. Form 10-Q, supra note 26; Form 10-K, supra note 26.
29. Form 10-K, supra note 26, Item 1.
30. Form 10-Q, supra note 26; Form 10-K, supra note 26.
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1. Description of Business (Item 101)
Item 101 requires the company to report information about the
general development of the business during the past five years (or shorter period if the company does not have a five year history). 31 It requires
a narrative description of the business, including a description of
products and services, business practices, competitive conditions and
more. 32 Companies affected by climate change risk might use Item 101
to disclose the risk to their business operations. However, because the
Item 101 description of business tends to be a broad-based discussion of
operations – such as the products and services offered by the company –
disclosure of climate change risk is more likely to appear in other sections of the periodic reports. The business description might, nonetheless, include a description of new products and technologies being
developed in association with climate change risk if management believes it is material to the description of the company’s business. A description of the business is not required in the quarterly reports. 33
2. Legal Proceedings (Item 103)
Item 103 of Regulation S-K is designed for the company to disclose
“any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business.” 34 However, the instructions to
Item 103 state that an issuer need not provide information with respect
to a litigation proceeding seeking damages if the damages would not
exceed 10% of the consolidated assets of the company and its

31. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2008). Smaller reporting companies
need only describe the development of the business during the past three years. Id. §
229.101(h). “Smaller reporting companies” are companies with public float of less than
$75 million, or if they have no float at all, revenues less than $50 million. Id. §
229.10(f)(1) (2008). Investment companies, asset-backed issuers and majority-owned
subsidiaries of a non-small reporting company parent do not qualify as smaller
reporting companies. Id. The “smaller reporting company” concept replaced the “small
business issuer” concept, expanded the size of companies who fit the definition, and
transferred the rules for these types of entities from Regulation S-B to the appropriate
places in Regulation S-K. Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and
Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8876, 92 SEC Docket 436 (Dec. 19,
2007).
32. Regulation S-K § 229.101(c).
33. Form 10-Q, supra note 26.
34. Regulation S-K § 229.103.
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subsidiaries. 35 Companies involved in climate change-related litigation
must therefore disclose that litigation under Item 103 only if the 10%
threshold is reached. Thus, at present, climate change disclosure is
likely to appear under Item 103 only if the company has run afoul of an
environmental regulation that carries significant monetary penalties or
civil liability. Liability of this magnitude is relatively scarce and would
likely grab headlines irrespective of the disclosure required by Item 103.
3. MD&A: Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Item 303)
Item 303 of Regulation S-K is designed to allow management to
disclose its own explanation for the financial condition and results of
operations for the time period covered by the form. 36 Although Item
303 contains significant detail about what the issuer must disclose, such
as trends and commitments related to the company’s liquidity and
capital resources, the issuer also must provide all information it believes
is “necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations,” even if the information is
not specifically itemized in Item 303 of the regulation. 37 Thus, management might describe climate change risks under Item 303, particularly if
they have a significant financial impact. If, however, management has
not yet evaluated the financial impact of climate change, there would be
nothing to disclose in the MD&A regarding climate change risk.
4. Risk Factors (Item 503(c))
Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K requires the company to disclose the
most significant factors that make ownership of the company’s securities
risky. 38 The risk factors are included in the company’s prospectus,
which is delivered at the time the securities are first issued, and also
appear in the annual reports on Form 10-K. 39 In addition, Form 10-Q
35.
36.

Id.
Regulation S-K § 229.303(a). For example, the time period covered by the first
Form 10-Q a company files during a fiscal year is the most recently completed fiscal
quarter. The “MD&A” would analyze that quarter, and the comparative quarter from
the previous fiscal year. Regulation S-K § 229.303(b). Smaller reporting companies
have reduced requirements for the MD&A. Regulation S-K § 229.303(d).
37. Id.
38. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c).
39. Id.; Form 10-K, supra note 26, at Item 1A. Smaller reporting companies are
not required to furnish risk factors in the annual report. Id. at Item 1A.
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requires quarterly reports to include any material changes in the risk
factors that were reported in the last annual report. 40
Risk factors are taken seriously enough by the SEC that Item 503(c)
explicitly requires a concise and logically organized presentation. 41 The
risk factors may not be hidden amongst the rest of the often lengthy and
technical reports. 42 Item 503(c) does not attempt to itemize the entire
range of risks that may require disclosure, instead providing only a
generic list of risks, including lack of operating history, lack of recent
profitable operations, and lack of a market for the common stock of the
company. 43 Actual risk factor disclosure normally goes far beyond these
generic categories. Thus, details about climate change risks are a natural
fit in the risk factors section of the periodic reports – assuming management is aware of and knowledgeable about climate change risks. At
present, companies are not, in any widespread sense, using the 503(c)
risk factors section to disclose climate change risks. 44
5. Financial Statements
Each annual report on Form 10-K must include audited financial
statements of the company for the most recently completed fiscal year,
with comparative information for prior years.45 Audited financial statements include in the footnotes a section on contingent liabilities. 46 The
contingent liability rules apply when there is “an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible . . .
40. Form 10-Q, supra note 26, at Item 1A. Because smaller reporting companies
are not required to furnish risk factors in the annual report, there is no requirement that
their risk factors be updated on a quarterly basis. Id.
41. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c).
42. Id. This is part of the SEC’s “Plain English” rule, which currently only applies
to prospectuses, risk factor disclosures and some of the executive compensation disclosure in periodic reports. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
43. Regulation S-K § 229.503(c).
44. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
45. Form 10-K, supra note 26, at Item 8. The method of preparation, content and
form of the audited financial statements are governed by Regulation S-X under the
Exchange Act. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2007). Form 10-Q also requires
financial statements for the shorter period covered by the quarterly report, but they may
be unaudited. Form 10-Q, supra note 26, Item 1; Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §210.1001(a) (2007).
46. Financial Accounting Standards Board, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (Mar. 1975) [hereinafter
FASB NO. 5], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS5.pdf.
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loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or
more future events occur or fail to occur.” 47 Examples include “[p]ending or threatened litigation . . . [a]ctual or possible claims and assessments . . . [and] [r]isk of loss from catastrophes assumed by property and
casualty insurance companies including reinsurance companies.” 48
Disclosure of asserted claims is required if the loss is probable and
can be reasonably estimated, or if there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss may have occurred (regardless of whether it can be reasonably estimated). 49 Under the FASB rules, a loss is “probable” if it is
“likely to occur.” 50 A “reasonable possibility” of loss means the chance
of the loss occurring is more than slight, but less than likely.51 If a claim
is unasserted, disclosure is required only if the loss is probable and there
is a reasonable possibility that the outcome will be negative. 52
It is possible for plaintiffs to assert claims associated with climate
change risk and other environmental matters now, particularly if they
relate to a violation of governmental laws or regulations. In that event,
such contingent liabilities must be disclosed if the potential negative
financial consequences meet the FASB standards. These requirements
for the audited financial statements, however, cover much the same
ground as the Item 103 disclosures relating to litigation, although the
triggers for disclosure are stated differently. 53 Still, this captures only a
small piece of the climate change risk puzzle: the portion that results in
litigation with potential financial consequences exceeding the FASB
thresholds. Many contingent liabilities associated with climate change
may be in the unasserted category at this stage of climate change
science, meaning disclosure will only be triggered in the financial state-

47.
48.
49.

Id. at FAS5-2.
Id. at FAS5-3.
Id. at FAS5-4. New rules in the mergers and acquisitions context require the
participants to assign a market value to contingent liabilities, regardless of their likelihood or estimability. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (REVISED 2007): BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, 8 (Dec.
2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas141r.pdf. There are different rules for
contingencies that are non-contractual. Id. Those new rules do not apply in the context
of periodic reporting in the quarterly and annual reports. See id.
50. FASB NO. 5, supra note 46, at FAS5-2.
51. Id.
52. Id. at FAS5-4.
53. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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ments only if the loss is probable and there is a reasonable possibility
that the outcome will be negative. 54
B. Materiality
Even under these SEC rules and regulations, information must be
disclosed in quarterly and annual reports only if it is material. 55 The
United States Supreme Court has formulated the materiality standard as
information a reasonable investor would consider important in making
an investment decision. 56 With respect to future events, the probability
of the event occurring must be evaluated in light of the magnitude of the
event. 57 Public corporations must consider this materiality standard in
determining whether to disclose information about how climate change
is affecting, or may affect, their businesses. Judging from the issuers’
responses, many corporations do not consider climate change risk material to their businesses, contrary to what investors are saying is important
to them. 58
The SEC has at times viewed materiality primarily through an
economic lens, leaving so-called “social disclosure” out of the process.59
For example, in the early 1970s, the Natural Resources Defense Council
proposed mandatory disclosure of environmental and civil rights matters. 60 The SEC, however, decided that such matters were not material
to investors, in part because they were not economically focused. 61
Clearly, the tide has shifted with respect to global warming and other
environmental matters, which are no longer considered mere social
issues. 62 At the time of the NRDC petition, only a small segment of the
investing public was interested in better environmental disclosure. 63
54.
55.

FASB NO. 5, supra note 46, at FAS5-4.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (describing Employment of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices).
56. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 237-40 (1988).
57. Id. at 238.
58. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
59. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1251 (1999).
60. Id. at 1246-73. Professor Williams devotes an entire section of her article to
the details of the SEC’s proceedings on the NRDC petition.
61. Id. at 1252-55.
62. Even in 1999, Professor Williams wrote that the same issues would be
considered material today using the SEC’s standards two decades ago. Id.
63. Id. at 1255-56.
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Today, the Social Investment Forum suggests that socially responsible
investing accounts for approximately 11% of the investment market,
compared to a very small fraction cited at the time of the SEC’s decisions on the NRDC petition. 64
Harvard Professor Cynthia Williams disagrees with the premise that
materiality is primarily an economic consideration, both from the standpoint of the legislative authority given to the SEC, and the SEC’s determinations of materiality on other issues of corporate accountability. 65
Yet it certainly is arguable that climate change risk disclosure fits the
materiality standard if evaluated solely by its economic effects. Even
without a direct economic tie-in, climate change risk disclosure also
serves the purpose of “providing investors with full and fair information
necessary to make informed investment decisions and to cast wellinformed votes to continue with the present management of a company,
to pressure management to adopt new strategies, or to vote for new
management.” 66 Moreover, there is justification for taking into account
the underlying moral issue when determining materiality to investors. 67
Corporations are given the status of legal persons by state law, and
should have as much responsibility – arguably more – for the health of
the planet and its inhabitants as any natural person.
PART II. CURRENT STATE OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISK DISCLOSURE
A. Company Participation in Existing Disclosure Systems
Researchers have decried the lack of meaningful public reporting
on climate change risks. 68 Several coalitions have engaged in efforts to
64. See Soc. Inv. Forum, Socially Responsible Investing Facts, available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009);
Williams, supra note 59, at 1251.
65. Williams, supra note 59, at 1263-68.
66. Id. at 1272.
67. Felix Frankfurter wrote “[t]he [Securities Act] embodies a wholly different
conception of business morals. It aims to make it difficult for corporate managers to
evade responsibility.” Id. at 1222-23 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities
Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 110 (regulating business morals was a “major
rationale” for the enactment of the Securities Act)). Although this Article examines
periodic reporting under the Exchange Act, disclosure is the hallmark of both the
Securities Act and Exchange Act, and the determination of materiality is the same under
both acts.
68. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a General
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improve climate change risk disclosure. For example, the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an organization that seeks to elevate reporting on economic, environmental and social performance to the same
level as financial disclosures. 69 GRI has developed a set of
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines relating to economic, environmental, human rights, labor, product responsibility and societal issues,
supplemented by separate “indicator protocols” for each of those subject
areas. 70
The GRI reporting is designed to occur outside of the securities
disclosure system. In fact, U.S. companies have objected to the GRI
guidelines as a tool for reporting to shareholders when shareholders have
requested GRI-based reports through the proxy regulation system. 71
Yet, of those companies filing sustainability reports under the GRI
guidelines, most are not reporting on environmental risk. Instead, they
focus on the positive opportunities arising from climate change issues.72
According to a recent GRI report co-authored with KPMG’s Global
Sustainability Services, “[environmental r]isks could be perceived to be
beyond current business planning horizons, or companies may not have
identified, explored or quantified risks associated with climate change
and may therefore not be in a position to report on risks.” 73
The aforementioned CERES coalition of investors, environmental
groups and other public interest organizations concerns itself directly
with securities disclosure on climate change. 74 It commissions reports on
Accounting Office Report on disclosure of environmental risks under the securities
laws, see Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate
Disclosure: Are Things Heating Up In the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 31921 (2008).
69. Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009).
70. G3 Guidelines, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guide
lines/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
71. See, e.g., Texas Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 2188373 (July 27,
2007); ConAgra Foods, SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 1489570 (July 1, 2004), each
arguing that the GRI guidelines are too vague and complex to serve as a basis for
disclosure to shareholders.
72. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE & KPMG’S GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY
SERVICES, REPORTING THE BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS 5 (2007), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/
rdonlyres/C451A32E-A046-493B-9C62-7020325F1E54/0/ClimateChange_GRI_KPM
G07.pdf. The survey evaluated GRI sustainability reports from 2006. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 5.
74. CERES REPORT, supra note 1.
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the status of climate change disclosure, and also makes recommendations for improved disclosure. 75 CERES reports that fewer than half of
the companies in the S&P 500 responded to a questionnaire about climate change risks, opportunities and strategies, a much lower figure than
the FT Global 500, a worldwide analog to the S&P 500. 76 Among those
companies that responded, nearly one-third refused to make their responses public. 77 Overall, responding companies provided approximately 25% of the information investors are seeking. 78
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) also maintains a reporting
system for climate change data, and its findings are no more encouraging. 79 The CDP, whose work in 2006 is relied upon in the CERES
Report, is a non-profit organization designed to foster the relationship
between investors and corporations on issues relating to climate
change. 80 Like GRI, the CDP system is external to the securities regulation system, although presumably a company willing to publicly
disclose its questionnaire responses on the CDP website could easily
incorporate the same disclosures in its securities filings.
According to the CDP, there are over 1,550 responding companies
around the world. 81 The 2007 results of the CDP questionnaire show
64% of the companies in the S&P 500 Index respond to the questionnaire, but only 49% of the S&P 500 companies publish their disclosures
on the CDP’s website. 82 The results show an improved trend from the
2006 data contained in the CERES Report with respect to companies’
willingness to respond and allow publication of the responses. Nevertheless, the gains are small. Still fewer than half of the companies are
publicly disclosing through the CDP. 83
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at ii.
Id.
Id. at 2. Lower emitting companies were less likely to respond than high emitting companies, such as those in the energy and automobile industries. Id. This likely
reflects the inability of high emitting companies to ignore the materiality of risks associated with climate change.
79. Carbon Disclosure Project, www.cdproject.net (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
80. Id.
81. Carbon Disclosure Project FAQs, http://www.cdproject.net/FAQs.asp (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009).
82. See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT REPORT
2007, GLOBAL FT500 37, www.cdproject.net/download.asp?file=CDP5_FT500_Report.
pdf.
83. The CDP sent out its latest questionnaire in February 2008, with a May 31
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The poor state of climate change disclosure was recently echoed
more directly by investors. In a 2007 petition to the SEC, a group of investors, environmental organizations and governmental constituencies
pointed out variations in the quality of disclosure among SEC filings of
members of the auto, insurance, energy, petrochemical and utilities industries from 2001-2006, calling it an “inconsistent patchwork of disclosure.” 84
B. Why Is Climate Change Disclosure So Scarce?
Perhaps the growing number of reporting systems in the domestic
and international communities contributes to the relatively poor participation in voluntary reporting schemes. How should a company choose a
system in which to participate? Or, if a company is required to participate in a state or federal reporting system, should it also participate in
a broader voluntary system? It may be that companies are willing to disclose, but the mechanics of disclosure are inconvenient.
Yet, there also are intuitive, non-mechanical reasons for reluctance
to disclose climate change risks. First, the scope of the evaluation of climate change risk within an organization may be enormous, depending
on the nature of the business. Daniel Esty and Andrew Winston postulate that the evaluation of climate change risk involves more than the
normal risk analysis, because it involves the upstream and downstream
supply chain. 85
Second, a large investigative scope would normally associate with

response deadline. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cdproject.net/currentquestionnaire.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). It already published the results in the
September 2008 report. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT
REPORT 2007, GLOBAL FT500, available at http://www.reeep.org/file_upload/9_tmpphp
7Jeutc.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
84. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 45-48.
85. Esty & Winston, supra note 13, at 116. Those authors suggest what they call
the “AUDIO” approach to evaluating a corporate environmental strategy. AUDIO also
is designed to identify issues and opportunities. AUDIO is merely an acronym for the
process of identifying the broad aspects of the environment that affect the business
(e.g., water, energy), evaluating the value chain both upstream and downstream to
identify the broad aspects affecting suppliers and customers, drilling down on what
specific issues arise from those aspects and looking for opportunities to profit from
them. Id. at 60-61. Climate change would be one “aspect” that would need to be evaluated at the subject company, in the company’s supply chain, and at the customer level.
See id. at 264.
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significant cost factors. Research and development costs may be large at
the outset, and may continue into the foreseeable future, particularly
because the exact effects of climate change are still being studied – and
will be for some time. 86 While there are profit opportunities in the environmental arena, they tend to have a long horizon, given the initial cost
outlay. 87 A long horizon of profitability does not fit well with the
current Wall Street culture that judges companies on a quarterly earnings
basis. 88
Third, even those companies that have evaluated the risk may not
fully appreciate its significance, or may have a distorted view of the risk.
If the current corporate norm is averse to disclosing climate change risk,
it may obscure the true nature of that risk. Some managers may even
believe the SEC’s relative silence on climate change disclosure is indicative that disclosure is not yet ripe. 89
86. If the company puts in place systems to track environmental issues going
forward – systems most companies do not currently have in place – the challenges may
be less daunting as time moves on. Id. at 173-80.
87. Focusing on business opportunities is a traditional way to provide incentives
for businesses to police themselves. See, e.g., THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
supra note 13. Not every profitable exercise will be undertaken, however. Businesses
have finite resources, and if a climate change opportunity offers a smaller return than
other, perhaps less environmentally-friendly alternatives, the climate change opportunity may not be pursued, despite its profitability. In addition, companies seem to have
less trouble identifying the opportunities than the risks, and that does not provide the
information investors seek. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88. See Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, Remarks at NYU Center for Law and
Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1998/spch220.txt.
89. A U.S. General Accounting Office Report in 2004 reported that the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance took the position that GHG disclosures were not yet
ripe because controls were not being adopted at the federal level, though the SEC
acknowledged that there were circumstances in which they were required to be disclosed under materiality standards. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE
WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 20-21 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf. The SEC has also been relatively stingy with respect to shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue reports
relating to climate change risks. See, e.g., ACE Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL
846610 (Mar. 19, 2007) (permitting the company to exclude a shareholder proposal
requesting a “report describing our company’s strategy and actions relative to climate
change,” including public policy and legislation, the effect on the company and steps
taken in response); Arch Coal, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 192477 (Jan. 17, 2008)
(permitting the company to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting a “report . . . on
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There is also evidence that managers do not make decisions that are
ultimately rational. The field of behavioralism seeks to explain the psychology of decision making, including decisions made within an organizational structure. 90 To the extent a corporation is a reflection of its
upper management, these behavioral factors may significantly influence
a company’s decision about whether a particular issue is material and
thus ripe for disclosure, or immaterial and exempt from disclosure
requirements. 91
As Professor Susanna Kim Ripken writes:

how the company is responding to rising regulatory, competitive, and public pressure to
significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions . . .”). Under current shareholder
proposal rules, the SEC walks a fine line in determining whether proposals relating to
climate change reports intrude upon management’s province of “ordinary business
matters” and require the company to “undertake an evaluation of risk.” Shareholder
Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2007). The SEC’s approach to these issues has
been deemed arbitrary and capricious, as they provide little information as the basis for
their decisions. A typical response in a SEC no-action letter reads like this: “There
appears to be some basis for your view that [Company Name] may exclude the proposal
under rule 14a-8(i)(7), as relating to [Company Name’s] ordinary business operations
(i.e., evaluation of risk).” See, e.g., Sunoco, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 384378
(Feb. 8, 2008). Professor Robert B. Ahdieh describes it like this: “[T]he [SEC]
Division [of Corporate Finance] seems to respond to no-action requests based on its gut
assessment of the proposal under review and a pair of self-constructed heuristic devices,
designed to offer at least the appearance of coherent analysis.” Robert B. Ahdieh, The
Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 173 (2007) (citing
Transcript of Roundtable Discussion Regarding Federal Proxy Rules & State
Corporation Law (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy
process/proxy-transcript050707.pdf).
90. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (addressing shareholder irrationality); Troy A. Paredes, Too
Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005) (addressing overconfidence of CEOs
and generally cataloguing the most prominent behavioral economics scholarship). See
generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Symposium, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to
Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology,
41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001); Kent Greenfield, Symposium, Corporations Theory and
Corporate Governance Law: Using Behavior Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002).
91. See Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 193 (1984).
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[T]he rationality of individuals’ decisions and actions is bounded
because of inevitable limits on time, attention, skill and information.
. . . People have a tendency to use heuristics, i.e., mental shortcuts or
rules of thumb, when making decisions about risks. . . . These
cognitive limitations come into play whenever a person must assess
92
the probability of an uncertain event . . . .

It is this very “probability of an uncertain event” that managers
must take into account when determining whether the risk is material for
purposes of securities law disclosure. 93
Among these heuristics is “overconfidence bias” in which a manager may place too much confidence in his or her judgment about what
the future holds. 94 According to Professor Ripken, “[c]orporate executives may take on too many risks with the belief that adverse outcomes
are unlikely to occur, or that they can be prevented from occurring by
executives’ own skill and expertise.” 95 Management’s miscalculation of
the probability of a risk may result in no disclosure under the materiality
standard. Alternatively, it may cause managers to distort the information
disclosed, by focusing more on opportunities associated with climate
change, and less on the real risks. 96
Of course, some members of upper management may not personally agree with the scientific trend supporting human contributions to
climate change. The “anchoring” heuristic recognizes that managers
may seek out information that only confirms their existing views. They
may not give enough credit to information that contradicts their existing
views. 97 Again, this could cause managers to place more emphasis on
disclosing the opportunities associated with climate change, and less on
the true risks. 98 This greater focus on opportunities is borne out by the
GRI findings. 99

92. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward A More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 157-59 (2006) (emphasis added).
93. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-40 (1988); see supra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
94. Ripken, supra note 92, at 163-66; Paredes, supra note 90, at 688-89.
95. Paredes, supra note 90, at 165.
96. Id. at 165-66.
97. Id. at 172-73.
98. See id. at 174-75.
99. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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It is easy to see that these biases could become more pronounced
where the managers are incentivized to maximize short-term profits,
because climate change risk evaluation and disclosure may threaten
those incentives. 100 Management may be reluctant to discover new
problems, particularly those with a long horizon, costly resolution and,
in some cases, the shame of public attention those problems might
receive. While this fear might seem antithetical to good business – after
all, theoretically the best companies survive by discovering risks in
advance and addressing them efficiently – the horizon for climate
change risks may be generations long, and management will likely have
little experience with such long time frames. If the company discovers a
host of problems with only costly long-term solutions, short-term
investor reaction may be more harsh than if the company ignored the
risks altogether. In addition, the fact that some companies are willing to
file sustainability reports with the Carbon Disclosure Project, but not
make them publicly available or include them in securities filings,
indicates that management fears the potential liability associated with
securities law disclosure.
PART III. EVALUATING CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
SYSTEMS AND PROPOSALS
A. Disclosure Systems Outside the Securities Law Framework
The GRI is self-described as a “large multi-stakeholder network of
thousands of experts” that “has pioneered the development of the
world’s most widely used sustainability reporting framework.” 101 As
previously described, the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines have
an environmental component. 102 The Sustainability Reporting Guidelines are 40 pages of general guidelines, followed by “indicator protocols” for each of the subject areas (e.g., environmental, human rights,
etc.). 103 The environmental indicator protocols are further broken down
into categories such as biodiversity, energy and emissions, and others.
These comprise an additional 38 pages. 104 GRI has disclosed that
100.
101.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Global Reporting Initiative, What We Do, http://www.globalreporting.org/
AboutGRI/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. Global Reporting Initiative, Indicator Protocols Set: EN, Version 3.0, available
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thousands of companies are issuing sustainability reports under the GRI
Guidelines. 105
Although a significant number of public companies are using the
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, they seem to focus more on environmental opportunities, and less on the risks associated with climate
change. 106 In addition, many companies have claimed the Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines are too vague and complex to be workable. 107 The
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines have not found their way into
periodic filings under the securities disclosure system with anything
approaching regularity. At this point in time, they are not a significant
or convenient source of investor information about climate change risk.
Similarly, the Carbon Disclosure Project operates externally to the
securities regulation framework. As of July 2008, CDP reported that 385
“signatory investors” are part of the CDP effort to get public companies
to respond to the CDP questionnaire. 108 The questionnaire asks for responses on risks and opportunities associated with climate change, corporate strategies, corporate governance and accounting matters, among
other things. 109 While responses have been on the rise, still fewer than
one-half of the companies in the S&P 500 agreed to have their responses
publicly disclosed on the CDP’s Internet site, much less in securities
filings. 110 Moreover, like the other existing reporting systems, the disclosures on the Carbon Disclosure Project website are largely hidden
from a general investing public that is unaware the Carbon Disclosure
Project exists.

at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/F9BECDB8-95BE-4636-9F63-F8D91
21900D4/0/G3_IP_Environment.pdf.
105. See Global Reporting Initiative, What We Do, supra note 101. Not all of those
companies are domestic. Id.
106. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. One can debate whether the GRI
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines are actually too vague and complex, or whether
those are convenient arguments made by lawyers in the context of excluding shareholder proposals from annual proxy statements. If they are too vague or complex, the
disclosure system is not going to be effective in informing consumers or investors. See
Ripken, supra note 92, at 157-59.
108. Carbon Disclosure Project, Signatory Investors, http://www.cdproject.net/
signatory-investors.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
109. Carbon Disclosure Project, Letter and Questionnaire: Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
Emissions and Climate Change, Questionnaire 2-6 (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://
www.cdproject.net/download.asp?file=CDP6_Letter_and_Questionnaire.pdf.
110. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project have made significant
inroads to obtaining greater corporate disclosure of risks relating to climate change by pressuring corporations to voluntarily report these risks
through proprietary systems created by those entities. Yet the level of
participation remains unsatisfying, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
In addition, their existence outside of traditional securities disclosure
channels makes them of dubious value to most investors.
GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project are by no means the only
existing avenues for voluntary disclosure of climate change data. For
example, the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency each have a voluntary system for reporting GHG emissions.111
Several states have implemented (or plan to implement) GHG registries,
and in some cases the registries require mandatory disclosure of GHG
emissions. 112 Various international bodies have a mandatory registry as
well, though their goals are not exclusively to promote disclosure. 113
In a recent symposium at the University of Virginia School of Law,
Cornell law student Andrew Schatz argued for a scheme of mandatory
disclosure of GHG emissions through the creation of a Greenhouse Gas
Release Inventory (GGRI). 114 This proposed GGRI would exist outside
the securities regulation framework. 115 Schatz identified five underlying
principles of the GGRI proposal: “1) mandatory disclosure, 2) standardized information, 3) identification of companies, 4) reporting at
regular intervals and 5) a primary purpose of reducing risks.” 116

111. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENHANCING DOE’S VOLUNTARY
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES (1605(b)) PROGRAM, http://www.pi.energy.gov/
enhancingGHGregistry/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009); U.S. EPA, CLIMATE LEADERS,
http://www.epa.gov/stateply/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
112. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION
BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 10-17 (Jan. 18, 2007), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80733.pdf.
113. See, e.g., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/climat/emission/mrg_en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2009); AUSTRALIAN
GOV’T, DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL GREENHOUSE ACCOUNTS,
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/inventory/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
114. Andrew Schatz, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information
Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335 (2008).
115. Id. at 365-67.
116. Id. at 382 (citing MARY GRAHAM, HARVARD UNIV. INNOVATIONS IN AM. GOV’T
PROGRAM, INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 5 (May
2001), available at http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/0/74.pdf.
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Schatz’s proposed GGRI is an interesting idea, particularly because
it incorporates the elements of an effective disclosure system.117
However, because the GGRI is not part of the periodic reporting system
required by the securities laws, it would not be a sufficient means of getting information to securities investors. By Schatz’s own admission, investors may not have the time and energy to find the GGRI information. 118 Moreover, the GGRI would rely on The Greenhouse Gas
Protocol adopted by the World Resources Institute, a data-based reporting system calling for reporting of “scope 1 and scope 2 emissions,”
“emissions data for all six GHG’s separately (CO2, CH4, N20, HFCs,
PFCs, SF6)” and “direct CO2 emissions from biologically sequestered
carbon,” among other things. 119 This information would be appropriately standardized, but even if an investor could find the GGRI, the level
and kind of raw detail in a GGRI is still unlikely to be understood by
even the most sophisticated investor. The GGRI is geared towards technical information to accomplish risk reduction. 120 Investors need a version of the risks posed by GHG emissions that they can understand.
The sheer number of registries and reporting systems presents an
inefficient solution for investors, particularly when considering the kind
of technical data that these reporting systems require. If companies were
more willing to make disclosures, and investors were able to find them,
there are still too many reporting systems for companies to use all of
them. Such fractured reporting would only confuse investors, even if
they were able to find the different reports and interpret them accurately.
B. CERES Requests for Improved Securities Disclosure
The CERES report in March 2007 (the “CERES Report”) encouraged companies to “elevate climate change as a corporate priority and
communicate openly with investors about their strategies and responses.” 121 The CERES Report contains specific recommendations for
climate change reporting under the securities laws, relying heavily on
117.
118.

Id.
Schatz, supra note 114, at 391-92. To be clear, Schatz’s goal for the GGRI was
not based on getting information to investors.
119. THE GREENHOUSE PROTOCOL INITIATIVE, A CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND
REPORTING STANDARD 63 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/
downloads/Publications/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf.
120. Schatz, supra note 114, at 382.
121. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
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the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure. 122 The Global
Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure was developed by fourteen
institutional investors in October 2006 to standardize climate risk
disclosure. 123 Specifically, the four elements of disclosure are: (1) disclosing historical, current and projected greenhouse gas emissions; (2)
analyzing climate risk and emissions management; (3) assessing physical risks; and (4) analyzing regulatory risks relating to greenhouse
gases. 124
The CERES recommendations are well thought out and clear, but
they do not represent the first requests from investors for more climate
change risk disclosure. Requests have been coming from institutional
investors for twenty years. 125 These repeated requests have resulted in
more disclosure in periodic securities filings, but progress has been
slow, as indicated by responses to recent surveys that still show investtors receiving approximately 25% of the information they want. 126
While the CERES recommendations are laudable, they have not gained
sufficient traction in their present form. They are effecting change too
slowly, given the enormity and complexity of the global warming
problem and the apparent corporate resistance to voluntary disclosure.
Part IV of this Article proposes paring back some of the CERES guidelines to better fit the securities regulation scheme, and suggests the SEC
should use these slimmer guidelines as a means of implementing mandatory disclosure of climate change risks.
C. Climate Risk Petition to SEC
A collection of institutional investors, governmental officers, attorneys general, environmental organizations and non-profit groups is
addressing the disclosure issue more directly under the securities law
framework. In the aforementioned Climate Risk Petition, these groups
are asking the SEC to issue interpretive guidance for reporting climate
change issues under existing mandatory disclosure rules and regulations,
including Items 101, 103 and 303 of Regulation S-K.127 The petition
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. This Article will return to these four elements when formulating a framework for mandatory disclosure under the securities laws.
125. White, supra note 15, at 32, 47-50.
126. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
127. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 15-18. The Climate Risk Petition
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also discusses financial disclosures of climate change risks under FASB
No. 5. 128 Specifically, the petition requests prompt “clarification” from
the SEC that registrants must review relevant information about climate
change risks and disclose material information associated with climate
change physical risks and legal proceedings, as well as financial risks
and opportunities associated with CO2 emissions. 129
The core concept underlying the Climate Risk Petition is that
climate change is now material for many, if not most, companies. 130
The Climate Risk Petition asserts that climate change risks are important
to investors, as indicated by the calls for change coming from investor
groups. 131 The petition suggests that it will be enough if the SEC clearly

relies on a Friends of the Earth report descriptively entitled Fifth Survey of Climate
Change Disclosure in SEC Filings of Automobile, Insurance, Oil & Gas,
Petrochemical, and Utilities Companies, issued in October 2006. Id.; MICHELLE CHANFISHEL, FRIENDS OF EARTH – US, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN
SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES
COMPANIES (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/SECFinalReport
andAppendices.pdf. In October 2007, the Free Enterprise Action Fund (FEAF) also
petitioned the SEC to require companies to disclose risks associated with global warming regulations, but with a different underlying purpose. The FEAF proposal seeks
disclosure about regulatory risk as a means of exposing the high cost of regulation, with
a view to curtailing additional global warming regulation. Press Release, Free
Enterprise Action Fund, SEC Petitioned to Require Companies to Disclose Risk of
Global Warming Regulation; Free Enterprise Action Fund (Ticker: FEAOX) Says
Companies Risk Earnings While Keeping Shareholders in the Dark (Oct. 30, 2007),
http://www.freeenterpriseactionfund.com/release103007. FEAF considers social responsibility to be “anti-business.” Free Enterprise Action Fund, Advocacy, http://www.
freeenterpriseactionfund.com/advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2009). FEAF is also
involved in the shareholder proposal process. FEAF has identified companies with stated climate change policies that have supported global warming regulation, and asked
those companies to disclose the cost of the regulatory uncertainty. See, e.g., General
Electric, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 329028 (Jan. 31, 2007); PepsiCo, SEC NoAction Letter, 2008 WL 555650 (Feb. 28, 2008). Many of the FEAF shareholder
proposals refer to global warming as “junk science.” See, e.g., General Electric, SEC
No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 329028, at *8 (Jan. 31, 2007) (“Is junk science-based
global warming regulation what the world needs?”).
128. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 15.
129. Id. at 53, 56.
130. See id. at 13-14.
131. The petition contains a list of advisory services, investment research firms,
market indices and mutual funds relating to climate change issues. Id. at 35-38. It also
cites some of the investor initiatives described in the text accompanying notes 101-26,
such as GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project. Id. at 39-40.
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affirms that registrants must give “close and well informed attention” to
climate change risks and disclose material effects of climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions on their operations and financial condition. 132
Thus, the petition primarily asks the SEC to declare climate change risks
important enough for companies to evaluate. 133 It then relies on existing
securities laws to mandate disclosure if the companies find material
information in that evaluation. 134
The Climate Risk Petition recognizes that the securities regulatory
scheme already has in place a mandatory disclosure system based on
rules in Regulation S-K and the concept of materiality. 135 However, the
current disclosure system is not tailored to global warming risks, and the
SEC has been unclear about its policies relating to climate risk disclosure under the securities laws. 136 This explains the petition’s request
for “clarification” from the SEC regarding climate change disclosure
under the securities disclosure system, as well as its plea for the SEC to
act promptly.
Yet the Climate Risk Petition is unclear about what it really wants.
In several places, it mentions broad categories of disclosure, including:
(1) physical risks, (2) financial risks and opportunities associated with
greenhouse gas regulation, and (3) legal proceedings. 137 It also requests
that the SEC “set forth the elements of disclosure appropriate for those
companies that determine that climate risk has a material impact on their
performance and operations.” 138 The Climate Risk Petition does not,
however, guide the SEC with respect to what the “elements of disclosure” are, beyond having mentioned the importance of physical, financial and legal risks and opportunities.
In fact, the Climate Risk Petition seems to be afraid to ask for too
much. Its introduction calls for “a statement from the Commission that
companies must consider climate risk in their review of information that
may be material and subject to disclosure” and states that “the Com-

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 9, 14.
See id. at 15-20.
See supra Part I.
See Wallace, supra note 68, at 319-21; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 16-17
(July 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf.
137. CLIMATE RISK PETITION, supra note 1, at 53.
138. Id. at 52.
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mission should clarify that, under existing law, registrants must disclose
any and all material information related to climate change.”139 While
the petition asserts that the physical, financial and legal risks relating to
climate change “may be . . . subject to disclosure,” it fails to suggest the
SEC make those elements part of the clarification. 140 Finally, in the
closing paragraph, the petition requests “simply . . . a clear affirmation
that . . . registrants must give close and well informed attention to potential climate change risks that may affect them and . . . consistent with
established law, disclose material information relating to the impacts of
climate change and greenhouse gas regulation . . . .” 141
Although the Climate Risk Petition mentions broad categories of
disclosure, the introduction and final paragraphs appear to seek nothing
more than a declaration from the SEC that companies should do what
the securities laws already require them to do. Accordingly, reporting
companies may view any such SEC guidance or “clarification” neutrally, because it only rehashes the companies’ already-existing duties under
the securities laws. Perhaps there would be an uptick in the number of
corporations that investigate climate change matters, simply because the
issuance of guidance would mean the SEC is showing an interest.
Nevertheless, the decision about which matters to investigate and which
matters are material would remain with the same managers making those
decisions today under the same securities laws in effect today, clouded
by the same heuristics. 142 So far, that has not been a successful means of
achieving effective climate change risk disclosure.
D. An Analogy to “Y2K”: Is SEC Rulemaking on Climate Change
Risk Disclosure Appropriate?
The Climate Risk Petition is the most recent and most direct
attempt to improve climate change risk disclosure in securities law
filings. Its approach is to seek guidance from the SEC regarding compliance with existing securities laws. That prompts the question: Should
the SEC’s framework for disclosure of material climate change risks be
stated through guidance regarding the applicability of existing laws and
rules, or through the more formal rulemaking process?

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 9.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 56.
See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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The climate change risk disclosure issue finds some similarities to
the “Year 2000” disclosure issue faced by public companies in the late
1990s. Like climate change risk disclosure, many public companies
were already addressing the Year 2000 problem in their disclosures. 143
The SEC noted, “[w]hile the number of companies disclosing Year 2000
issues has increased dramatically, the task force surveys show that many
companies are not providing the quality of disclosure that we believe
investors expect.” 144 Like climate change issues, the solutions to the
Year 2000 problem were not entirely clear at the time the SEC decided
to act, but time was of the essence.
In the Year 2000 situation, the SEC chose the guidance approach to
assist public companies with their Year 2000 disclosures. 145 There were
several reasons for this approach. The process for issuing SEC guidance
is much more nimble – and arguably more suited to a moving and
evolving target – than rulemaking. Rulemaking often begins with a
“concept release” that outlines the broad issues to be addressed and
seeks public responses to a series of questions. 146 If, after receiving the
public responses, the SEC decides to continue the rulemaking process, it
issues a “proposed rule,” which is essentially a good draft of the rule
accompanied by the SEC’s explanation of the reasoning behind the
provisions. 147 The time period between a concept release and proposed
rule varies, but as with legislation, drafting a formal rule takes time and
study. The proposed rule is then made available for comment by members of the public for a short time period, usually between 30-60 days,148
although for high profile or complex rules the time period may be
143. Interpretation: Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public
Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities
Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-7558 (July 29, 1998), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7558.htm [hereinafter SEC Year 2000 Release].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See SEC, SEC Concept Releases, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept.shtml (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009).
147. See SEC, SEC Proposed Rules, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009).
148. See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-57967 (June 16, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf (allowing 39 days for public
comment); see also SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov
/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
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longer. 149 After the comment period, the SEC studies the responses and,
if warranted, formulates a final rule. 150
The SEC issued guidance for the Year 2000 problem in part because it did not have time to wait for the rulemaking process to be completed, particularly in light of the fact that the release was adopted only
17 months before the calendar turned to 2000. 151 In addition, it could
have more easily updated its guidance with subsequent releases, as the
problems associated with the Year 2000 became more evident. In other
words, guidance allowed the SEC to react to the Year 2000 problem “on
the fly,” or at least as close to that concept as a large government agency
is able to get. Similarly, SEC guidance would allow a quick response to
the climate change disclosure problem, but would also permit the flexibility to update the response as climate change effects and solutions
evolve.
Also, like climate change disclosure, the Year 2000 problem was
not a problem for many public companies, and even those companies
affected by the Year 2000 issue were affected in different ways. The
SEC made clear that its statement regarding disclosure of the Year 2000
problem was not a declaration that every company had a Year 2000
problem, even though every company probably owned a computer. 152
149. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-56161 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/2007/34-56161.pdf (allowing 67 days for public comment on the highprofile issue regarding proxy proposals and election of directors); Modernization of the
Oil and Gas Reporting Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 33-8935 (June 26,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8935.pdf (allowing 74
days for public comment on a rule involving complex and controversial methods of
calculation).
150. An illustration may be helpful. In December 2007, the SEC issued a concept
release regarding changes to disclosure requirements relating to oil and gas reserves.
Concept Release on Possible Revisions to the Disclosure Requirements Relating to Oil
and Gas Reserves, Securities Act Release No. 33-8870 (Dec. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2007/33-8870.pdf. The SEC allowed approximately
two months for comment. Id. at 1. In June 2008, the SEC published its proposed rule
on the issue, and allowed until September 2008 for public comment on the proposed
rule. Modernization of the Oil and Gas Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act Release
No. 33-8935 (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/338935.pdf. The comment period expired September 8, 2008. With a September
comment date and a complex rule, it seems unlikely that the final rule will appear
within 12 months of the concept release.
151. SEC Year 2000 Release, supra note 143.
152. See Interpretation: FAQ About the Statement of the Commission Regarding
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The SEC wrote that “[m]erely because a matter was addressed in the
Release does not mean it applies to every company.”153 Similarly, not
every company is affected by climate change risk to the same degree.
Arguably, the less pervasive the subject matter, the less likely it is a
candidate for the more formal rulemaking process.
Yet there is something unsettling about mere “guidance” on climate
change risk disclosure. Climate change risk has a permanence that the
Year 2000 computer glitch did not. The consequences are presumably
greater as well. Guidance serves as no more than an interpretation of
existing law, without carrying the force of law. Given the perhaps infinite time horizon and consequences associated with climate change
issues, guidance has the appearance of a weak response, particularly if it
consists of a mere SEC pronouncement that companies should adhere to
the strictures of current disclosure regulations, which seems to be the
crux of the Climate Risk Petition. 154
Importantly, the SEC rulemaking process carries the force of law
and has a permanence that mere guidance does not. It is that force and
permanence that provides the greatest impact on improving climate
change risk disclosure. Unlike the Year 2000 problem, there is no definable end date for climate change; that, too, seems to warrant a more
permanent and formal pronouncement. Although there is a sense of urgency about climate change risks, there is no hard and fast date (like
December 31, 1999) by which the task must be accomplished. There is
time for rulemaking on climate change risk disclosure.
Of course, the science of climate change is a moving target. The
rules might need to evolve over time. The rules may be amended, which
would entail the rulemaking process again and might not be nimble
enough to keep up with the changes. But the SEC would still have, after
adopting formal rules, the flexibility to issue guidance with respect to
those rules, thus attacking the problem with the best features of both
rulemaking and guidance.
Moreover, climate change risk disclosure is an area that could
benefit from public comment. While the particular details of each Year
2000 problem were still being analyzed in 1998, the general effect of the
problem (computer shutdowns) and the broad solution (fix the dates in
Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7609 (Nov. 9, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/337609.htm.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
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the computer) were apparent. Public comment from investors would
likely have added little substance to the SEC’s pronouncement and
would have only delayed the process. In contrast, in many cases even
broad solutions to climate change risk are still in development, and the
number of ways industries and companies are affected by and affect
climate change remains to be discovered. Public input from various
stakeholders would inform the rules.
If the SEC takes the rulemaking path, it will need to provide a list
of specific climate change disclosures, like those requested of companies
in the CERES report. 155 An overly broad list would potentially capture
too many issues, trapping some companies in its net with respect to
issues that are irrelevant to them. Conversely, a narrow list would capture too few. The SEC is not inexperienced in this regard, however.
Regulation S-K is replete with lists that apply to some, but not all
companies. 156 And, the same concerns arose in the SEC’s release for the
Year 2000 problem. 157
The next section of this Article recommends a list of mandatory climate change disclosures that would be appropriate for inclusion in either
SEC guidance or rulemaking, in the hope of balancing the investor’s
need for information and the company’s ability to comply.
PART IV. PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF MANDATORY CLIMATE CHANGE
DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES FILINGS
Unlike the Climate Risk Petition, the CERES report contains detailed information about what investors want with respect to climate
change disclosure. 158 The more detailed guidelines likely stem from the
CERES report’s call for voluntary disclosure, whereas the Climate Risk
155.
156.
157.

CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
See generally Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2007).
See SEC Year 2000 Release, supra note 143. The categories of information for
Year 2000 disclosure were “(1) the company’s state of readiness; (2) the costs to
address the Company’s Year 2000 issues; (3) the risks of the company’s Year 2000
issues; and (4) the company’s contingency plans.” Id. But, the same broad-based list
would not be feasible for climate change disclosure. Unlike the Year 2000 problem, the
boundaries of which were fixed, the climate change problem is comprehensive, multifaceted, and to some degree, still undocumented. A list like the Year 2000 disclosure
list – or even the categories suggested by the Climate Risk Petition – would be far too
broad to balance investors’ need for information and the company’s ability to
reasonably comply.
158. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at §§ 3.1.a, 3.2.a, 3.3.a, 3.4.a.
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Petition asks the SEC directly for guidance on compliance with mandatory disclosure items. The CERES guidelines form a suitable starting
point for creating mandatory disclosure of climate change risks, whether
through SEC rulemaking or guidance. 159
Because the CERES report seeks voluntary disclosure, however, it
requests some information that would not be proper for mandatory
disclosure under the securities laws. For one, the CERES requests include items that are generally inconsistent with other aspects of the
securities regulation scheme, as detailed further below. Moreover, some
of the requested information runs the risk of being overly complex or too
voluminous. In fact, too much disclosure and overly-complex disclosure
actually hinder good decision making by investors. 160 The “raw” reporting systems of GRI, the Carbon Disclosure Project, and the proposed
Greenhouse Gas Release Inventory suffer significantly from this problem; the CERES recommendations less so. Nevertheless, an effective
disclosure system needs to be reasonably concise.
This Part sets forth the specific CERES report requests and pares
them down to disclosure items suitable for mandatory disclosure rules or
guidance from the SEC. The CERES categories are:
•
•

Category 1: Strategic analysis of climate risk and
emissions management;
Category 2: GGH emissions disclosure;

159. Reliance on CERES as a framework for securities disclosure is not a new idea.
In 1999, Professor Williams suggested that the CERES principles were a “possible
prototype” for social disclosure in securities law filings. Williams, supra note 59, at
1202, n.12. At that time, CERES was in the process of standardizing its reporting
guidelines. Id. The CERES guidelines at the time asked companies to report on regulatory schemes in the areas of air and water quality, wildlife and habitat protection, and
chemical and radioactive material regulation, among other things. Id. at n.506. It also
sought information on products, a company’s supply chain, emissions, workplace health
and safety, and several other topics. Id. at n.507. The CERES report format at the time
was not focused on climate change risks, but rather, the broader spectrum of environmental risks. Id. One of the benefits Professor Williams saw in the CERES guidelines
was the fact that the format was somewhat standardized, allowing for cross-company
comparisons. Id. Ten years have passed since the CERES report cited in Professor
Williams’s article. In that time, CERES has added significant focus on climate change
recommendations, which serve as the starting point for the proposed mandatory
disclosure system advocated in this article.
160. Ripken, supra note 92, at 146-47 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)).
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Category 3: Physical risks; and
Category 4: Regulatory risks. 161

The recommendations below better reflect the detail investors want
in those categories – as compared to the Climate Risk Petition request –
but do not overreach into areas that would be problematic for mandatory
disclosure or inconsistent with the existing securities disclosure scheme.
The recommendations also focus on simplifying the information in
hopes of making the information more useful to investors.
A. Category 1: Strategic Analysis of Climate Risk
and Emissions Management
The CERES report requests three categories of disclosure relating
to the strategic analysis of climate risk and emissions management: (1) a
climate change policy statement, (2) a corporate statement of its risk
mitigation efforts, and (3) a description of corporate governance matters
related to climate change risks. 162 What investors seek is an analysis of
the challenges and opportunities faced by the company, including how it
affects the company’s ability to compete in the marketplace. 163
1. Climate Change Policy Statement
CERES requests a climate change policy statement reflecting “the
company’s current position on climate change, its responsibility to
address climate change, and its engagement with governments and
advocacy organizations to affect climate change policy.” 164
The CERES-recommended climate change policy statement should
be mandatory for all companies in their annual reports. 165 Although the
full scope of climate change remains unknown (and will remain that way
for some time), one would be hard-pressed to identify a company that
did not face one or more potential risks, given what scientists currently
know about the effects of climate change. For that reason, the climate
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Presumably, an annual statement of policy would be sufficient because policy
changes do not normally take place with a frequency warranting quarterly disclosure.
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change policy statement should not be tied to a materiality standard, but
rather, should be a required statement for every company.
Companies with a climate change policy should have no difficulty
including that policy in annual reports to the SEC. Those without one
should be required to either develop a policy or reveal to investors that
they have not adopted one. In that regard, the mandatory disclosure rule
or guidance could provide companies with opt-out language. In lieu of
describing its climate change policy, a company could be permitted to
include a statement that the company does not have a climate change
policy as of the time of the periodic filing, followed by an optional brief
explanation of why no climate change policy is in place.
Investors would gain a better understanding of the company’s
position on climate change from a policy standpoint. It should be relatively easy for investors to determine whether the company has a serious
commitment to addressing climate change risks, or whether the company
is lagging behind the market in that regard. For companies with weak
policies – or without a climate change policy at all – investors would be
able to exert pressure on the company to adopt a meaningful policy or
simply choose not to invest in that company.
2. Emissions Management
CERES requests an explanation of the company’s emissions
management activities, to elucidate what the company is doing to
minimize its own risks associated with climate change, as well as
identifying potential opportunities. 166 Specifically, the CERES report
requests information about how the company is addressing greenhouse gas emissions, including reduction targets, development of new
technologies and products and prospective timelines. 167
Every company should be required to disclose in its annual report
significant actions the company is taking to minimize its risks from the
effects of climate change, and to identify opportunities. There is some
evidence that companies are already identifying opportunities, but many
are not identifying the risks and describing steps to minimize those
risks. 168 Periodic reporting of efforts to reduce or offset greenhouse gas

166.
167.
168.

CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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emissions, as well as establishing reduction targets and timelines and investing in new technologies and products, must be part of this disclosure
process.
Unlike the climate change policy statement, the disclosure of the
company’s actions to minimize climate risk and to avail itself of
opportunities should be subject to the materiality standard. 169 The company that discloses no actions to minimize climate risk should be
required to include a statement in its periodic filings that “there are no
material risks to the company associated with climate change.”
In effect, this does what the Climate Risk Petition seeks: it
acknowledges climate change risk as worthy of investigation, and potentially material. This would eliminate the idea that climate change
risk, given the long time horizon and confusing science, is not material
enough for companies to investigate. It also would ensure investors that
the company has not simply forgotten about the issue. Companies that
believe there are no material risks from climate change would be required to say so explicitly, to inform investors that the risks have actually been considered. At the same time, management would not be forced
to disclose risks that are investigated and determined to be nonexistent
or immaterial.
3. Corporate Governance and Climate Change
CERES requests a description of corporate governance actions
relating to climate change, including the names of executives who
have oversight of climate risk, whether the board is involved in the climate change decision making process and whether executive compensation is linked with meeting climate risk objectives. 170
Every company should be required to include a statement in its
annual report regarding the board’s and management’s involvement in
addressing climate change risk. A simple statement regarding the frequency with which the board is updated on climate change policies and
169. The CERES report uses the word “significant,” but introducing a new standard
would be problematic. See CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at § 3.1.a (stating that
investors urge companies to disclose a strategic analysis that includes an explanation of
all significant actions the company is taking to minimize its climate risks). The concept
of materiality likely captures all actions that would be considered significant, and would
fit within the existing securities law framework.
170. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
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actions, and the titles of executives in charge of addressing climate
change risk, should suffice. For the same reasons advocated with respect to the climate change policy statement, there is no need to subject
this item to a materiality standard. Even companies that ultimately
determine they do not have any material climate change risks must have
investigated the issue and assigned a management team to the evaluation. Disclosing that the board and management are involved should be
painless for reporting companies.
Meanwhile, investors could take comfort in knowing that the
company has gone beyond mere policy statements and has engaged the
board and management in the process of implementing the policy.
Although the CERES report suggests identifying the executives by
name, it seems sufficient to identify them by title. The names of some
of the executives in charge of climate change risk may not already be
disclosed under other SEC rules and regulations, because some of the
positions may not be at the highest levels of the organization. Introducing new names in the periodic filings may create privacy and liability
issues for some of the individuals involved, without providing investors
with a sufficient benefit to outweigh the potential harm to the individual
members of management. The executives’ titles alone would be sufficient for investors to know that the company has engaged members of
management in the climate change risk process.
The CERES report also states, “companies should disclose whether
executive compensation is tied to meeting corporate climate objectives,
and if so, a description of how they are linked.” 171 This constitutes an
example of a CERES recommendation that ought to remain voluntary.
As discussed above, there are privacy and liability concerns associated
with revealing the names of executives who are not already named in
periodic filings. Revealing their compensation incentives would exacerbate that problem. In addition, recent executive compensation disclosure
reforms have been controversial. 172 Requiring additional compensation
disclosure relating to climate change risk would only fan the flames.
171.
172.

Id. at 16.
See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation –
Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277 (2007); see also Executive Compensation and
Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf. The SEC received over
20,000 comments on its proposed executive compensation rule. SEC, COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED RULE: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURE,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
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B. Category 2: GGH Emissions Disclosure
Regarding GGH emissions, CERES urges, that “companies should
disclose their total greenhouse gas emissions. Investors can use this
emissions data to help approximate the risk companies may face from
future climate change regulations.” 173
Specifically, CERES requests historical emissions data since
1990, current emissions data and estimated future emissions from
operations, including those associated with the supply chain. The
report recommends using the Corporate Accounting and Reporting
Standard of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol. 174
There are several problems with including the CERES recommendation, as written, as an element of mandatory disclosure through
rulemaking or guidance. First, it requests what amounts to a “data
dump” of greenhouse gas emissions. While some investors have the
wherewithal to interpret the emissions data, the vast majority of
investors will be no more informed than they would be in the absence of
the data. The Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard of the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol referenced in the report is the same standard
recommended by Andrew Schatz for his proposed Greenhouse Gas
Release Inventory, and suffers from the same deficiencies. 175 In other
words, most investors will not be able to approximate climate change
risk from the data simply because most investors are not qualified to do
so. Nor will investors be able to compare the emissions data provided
by one company with the emissions data provided by another. 176
Second, requiring data from as far back as 1990 is inconsistent with
the historical data required by SEC rules in every other context. For
example, companies report five years’ worth of historical data in their
annual report filings on Form 10-K 177 and the description of the business
173.
174.
175.
176.

CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
Id.
See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
Investors would be able determine who has greater emissions, of course, but
without the proper context. Bigger companies and companies in certain industries
(trucking companies, for instance) might have bigger emission numbers than smaller
companies or companies in other industries (financial services, for instance), but those
bigger numbers may not be indicative of poor climate change policies and procedures.
177. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(a) (2007). Smaller reporting companies
need not provide the financial disclosures required by Item 301(a). Id. § 229.301(c).
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experience of the management team similarly looks back only five
years. 178 To the extent greenhouse gas emission data is required, it
should not consist of data covering nearly 20 years. Rather, the historical reporting should go back only as far as necessary to allow investors
to see trends. Five years of data should be sufficient for that purpose,
although public comment on a proposed rule may suggest extending the
period to seven or even ten years.
Third, requiring projected emissions for the future is contrary to the
current reporting scheme under SEC rules with respect to other topics.
Companies are not required to include forecasts or projections in their
periodic reports. 179 When they do so voluntarily, they are able to use
statutory safe harbors for “forward looking statements.” 180 Accordingly,
the projected future emissions component of the CERES recommendation should be left to voluntary disclosure.
A better approach from the standpoint of mandatory disclosure is to
blend meaningful current and historical greenhouse gas emissions data
with the description of the actions management is taking to minimize
climate risk, as described in the recommendations for strategic analysis
of climate risk and emissions management. This amounts to a “management’s discussion and analysis” of greenhouse gas emissions. Because
investors are unlikely to have the ability to interpret raw emissions data,
management should interpret the data for investors, in language investors can understand. Instead of investors approximating the risk,
management should describe that risk in a clear and straightforward
manner, incorporating emissions data to illustrate the analyses. By analogy, this reader-friendly approach was the one taken in the 2006
executive compensation disclosure rules adopted by the SEC. 181 It
would also be useful for this reader-friendly discussion and analysis to

178. Id. § 229.101(a). Smaller reporting companies need only look back three years.
Id. § 229.101(b).
179. However, the SEC does “encourage” projections. Id.
180. § 229.303(c); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2007). Companies
providing projections are also advised to provide a set of assumptions and explanations
describing the limitations of those projections. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3). Projections
significantly increase the burden on the reporting company.
181. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.2006
/33-8732a.pdf.
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appear separately from the financial MD&A already required in the
annual reports. 182
C. Category 3: Physical Risks
CERES states as part of its recommended disclosure that the
physical risks associated with climate change be included in company
reporting.
CERES encourages companies to “analyze and disclose material,
physical effects that climate change may have on the company’s
business and its operations, including their supply chain.” This
analysis should describe how climate affects the operations generally,
and should take into account changed weather patterns, increases in
sea levels, availability of water, global warming and the potential
health issues affecting the workforce. CERES also asks for a description of how the company intends to adapt to those physical risks,
including a cost estimate of the adaptation. 183
The CERES recommendations are more detailed, but not dissimilar
to the request in the Climate Risk Petition regarding physical risks. The
recommendations are appropriately tied to the materiality standard. In
that regard, they reflect a company’s existing responsibilities under
Items 101 and 503(c) of Regulation S-K. 184 Because the physical risks
will vary from company to company, the disclosure of those risks must
necessarily be framed in a broad fashion.
Mandatory disclosure of physical risks should follow the standard
in the CERES recommendations, including the existing materiality
standard under the securities laws. While this may appear to require
companies to do what they are already required to do, the specific delineation of physical risks from climate change ought to highlight the issue
for companies. According to CERES, only one-third of the information

182. The SEC should consider whether smaller reporting companies should be
exempt from the emissions disclosure altogether, or whether the look back period
should be shorter than for larger issuers. Since smaller reporting companies are exempt
from including financial statements and have reduced MD&A requirements, it is
probably appropriate to omit this item from their mandatory disclosure. See supra notes
36, 177-79 and accompanying text.
183. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
184. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
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investors want from companies regarding physical risks is actually
disclosed. 185 If physical risks of climate change are specifically identified as an item for mandatory disclosure, that fraction is likely to rise. In
addition, if a company discloses no physical risks associated with climate change, investors can take more comfort that the risks are not
material – as opposed to the current situation, where investors may
believe the absence of disclosure means climate change risks may have
been overlooked or under-investigated by management.
D. Category 4: Regulatory Risks
According to the CERES Report, investors want to see known
trends, commitments and uncertainties associated with climate change
that may affect the financial or operating condition of the company.186
As part of that consideration, investors are interested in how governmental climate change regulations contribute to the financial and
operating condition.
CERES requests disclosure of all greenhouse gas regulations
imposed in all the countries where a company operates, and an estimate of the impact of those regulations. It also requests projected
carbon costs of meeting specified emissions reductions by 2015.
Finally, it requests scenario planning, by which companies define “a
limited number of plausible greenhouse gas regulatory scenarios” and
describe the effect on the company and shareholder value, including
in quantitative terms. 187
Much of the CERES recommendation is covered by Item 303 of
Regulation S-K in management’s discussion and analysis of the company’s financial condition. 188 Governmental regulation that has a material effect on the company’s operations and financial condition is a routine subject in that section of the periodic reports. Several of the CERES
recommendations go beyond descriptions of risks, however.
The CERES recommendation for a list of all greenhouse gas
regulations in every relevant country is a fine subject for voluntary disclosure, but inappropriate for mandatory disclosure. Such a list should
185.
186.
187.
188.

CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2007).
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be subject to materiality standards. In addition, the CERES recommendation that companies disclose the cost of emissions reductions at specified percentages by 2015 provides investors with useful information, but
not of the type appropriate for mandatory disclosure. The SEC does not
require companies to make forecasts or projections. 189 Therefore, requiring companies to make forecasts in connection with mandatory disclosure of climate change risks would likely be enough to prevent any
mandatory disclosure rules from passing muster. The same can be
claimed of the CERES-recommended “scenario planning.”
A more appropriate approach in the mandatory disclosure context
would be for the SEC to highlight in its guidance or rules the potential
materiality of government regulations associated with climate change
issues. Like the disclosure of physical risks, the specific mention of climate change regulation in SEC guidance or rules ought to cause companies to improve upon their current disclosure of these regulatory
risks. 190 Whether a company chooses to forecast emissions reductions
or the effects of various scenarios ought to be voluntary, and subject to
forward-looking statement safe harbors. 191
E. Plain English Disclosure
Certain portions of a written prospectus, required to be delivered in
connection with the issuance of securities, must comply with the SEC’s
so-called “Plain English” rules. 192 The Plain English rules are designed
to make the information in the prospectus – particularly in the risk
factors section of the prospectus – more accessible to investors. 193 The
Plain English rules include six basic principles:

189.
190.

See id. § 229.10(b).
CERES reports that less than half of the responding companies provided any
regulatory risks associated with climate change at all. CERES REPORT, supra note 1, at
27.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(c); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2007).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d).
193. Id. In a more general way, Rule 421(b) requires that the entire prospectus be
clear, concise and understandable. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b). The Plain English rules
originally applied only to certain portions of prospectuses and to risk factor disclosures.
However, the SEC later applied the Plain English rules to the executive compensation
disclosure items required in the periodic reports. Executive Compensation and Related
Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8732A (Nov. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.

2009

WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE
RISK DISCLOSURE
•
•
•
•
•
•

321

Shorter sentences;
Everyday language and elimination of ambiguity to
the extent possible;
Elimination of passive voice;
Graphical or tabular presentation of material, particularly when the material is complex;
Avoidance of legal or business jargon and technical
terms; and
Avoidance of multiple negatives. 194

The disclosure of legal matters – and most other subjects in securities filings – is written primarily by lawyers and features legal jargon,
passive voice and ambiguous writing. 195 The SEC’s Plain English rules
seek to curtail those tendencies in favor of a more understandable way of
communicating with the investing public. 196 Disclosure systems achieve
their goals only if the information is described in a clear fashion and in
such a way that the investors can understand. 197
The disclosure of climate change risk will likely be written with the
aid of scientists and will likely include specialized terminology and
other unique features associated with the technical writing commonly
utilized by the scientific community. Because of the complexity of climate change risk, particularly GHG emissions data, the mandatory
disclosure of emissions data should follow a management’s discussion
and analysis approach, as mentioned earlier. 198 In particular, this
climate change risk MD&A would benefit from Plain English; without
it, investors are unlikely to understand the disclosure. Of course, the
Plain English rules would be useful for the other elements of proposed
climate change risk disclosure, as well.
Plain English is particularly important as investors rely less on
intermediaries to make their investment decisions. 199 Individual invest-

194.
195.

Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(2) (2007).
See Ripken, supra note 92, at 186; see also, BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL
WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 24-25, 34, 37 (2001).
196. See § 230.421(d).
197. Ripken, supra note 92, at 146.
198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
199. Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1106 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 135, 166-70 (2002).
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ors are increasingly doing their own research and making their own
judgments about investments, without a stock broker or financial adviser
to help them interpret the data. 200 Without a layer of expertise between
the investor and the company, disclosure of complex and highly scientific data is potentially less effective. 201 Applying the Plain English
rules to climate change risk disclosure would help alleviate the potential
for investors to misunderstand the disclosure, or simply tune it out
because of information overload.
V. CONCLUSION
Although there may be some fear that mandating climate change
risk disclosure in securities filings will undermine voluntary reporting
through other outlets, such as GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project,
the disclosure proposed in this Article is largely consistent with those
reporting systems. Companies would not be engaging in duplication of
effort, and with electronic filing available in most of those systems,
filing in two or three locations should not be burdensome. At most, any
duplication of effort would be in applying Plain English to the otherwise
raw data that might be disclosed through other systems. No doubt plain
writing would be useful even when reporting in the voluntary systems.
It is simply too easy to argue that mandatory climate change risk
disclosure will be prohibitively expensive. All disclosure entails some
level of expense. The proposed mandatory disclosure guidelines in this
Article ought to involve no more expense than the disclosure required by
other reporting systems. Importantly, despite the cost factor, climate
change risk disclosure does not have to be a negative proposition for
companies. Executives who embrace the requirements and produce
timely, accurate and comprehensive disclosures will likely find themselves in a better position relative to their competitors, and subsequently
will be rewarded by shareholders and potential investors. Transparency
is a powerful force behind the Green Wave, and expectations rise daily. .
. . Environmental reports are a powerful tool to build trust with all
stakeholders.” 202 Not only does environmental reporting build trust with
investors and other stakeholders, the failure to provide the disclosure
introduces a shame factor that may be even more powerful. Moreover,
climate change concerns are growing among the populace every day, not
200.
201.
202.

See Dalley, supra note 199, at 1105-06.
See id.
ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 13, at 228.
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just investors. A company’s employees are increasingly likely to be
interested in, and even excited about, climate change initiatives. Rather
than seeing them as an unnecessary burden, employees likely will be
proud to be part of such a corporate culture.
Some will no doubt object that climate change risk disclosure is
merely a system to effect regulation on issues of climate change, and an
inefficient one. 203 Whether mandatory securities law disclosure ought to
have substantive regulatory goals is the subject of debate. 204 On the
topic of climate change risk disclosure, however, it should be enough
that investors are clamoring for information as part of their decisionmaking processes. Mandatory disclosure need not be based solely on
financial impact, but also can be geared towards providing investors
with more information by which to make decisions about company
management. 205
The mandatory disclosure rules proposed in this Article need not
provide a substantive solution to global warming, nor even a perfect
means of obtaining all relevant information about climate change risk
disclosure. Elected bodies have the power to enact global warming
legislation to regulate directly, and increasing public pressure will
motivate the elected. In the interim, if mandatory securities law disclosure can provide investors with meaningful and useful climate change
risk information to assist them in their investment decisions, it is a nice
secondary effect if mandatory disclosure helps motivate more positive
corporate attitudes towards global warming until appropriate regulatory
legislation arrives.

203. See, e.g., David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 380 (2005).
Although Professor Case believes disclosure is an important regulatory tool, he is
skeptical about whether the securities laws can serve as a “comprehensive informational
regulatory” source because of what he characterizes as the SEC’s “troubled record on
enforcing existing environmental disclosure requirements.” Id. at 410. However,
assuming arguendo that Professor Case is correct, a ramped up disclosure scheme for
global warming issues may still be a useful tool, even if it is not comprehensive.
204. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 199, and the sources cited therein; Ripken, supra
note 92; Williams, supra note 59, at 1209-35; Karen Bubna-Litic, Environmental
Reporting as a Communications Tool: A Question of Enforcement, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 69
(2008) (examining whether mandatory environmental reporting in Australia and
Norway translates into better corporate decision making on environmental matters).
205. See Williams, supra note 59, at 1204-07; supra notes 59-66 and accompanying
text.

